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Abstract
Empirical evidence from U.S. studies suggests that, on average, female
physicians earn less than their male counterparts. This gap in earnings
does not disappear when individual and market characteristics are con-
trolled for. This paper investigates whether a gender earnings di®erence
can also be observed in a health care system predominantly ¯nanced by
public insurance companies. Using a unique data set of physicians' earn-
ings recorded by a public social security agency in an Austrian province
between 2000 and 2004, we ¯nd a gender gap in average earnings of about
32 percent. A substantial share of this gap (20 to 47 percent) cannot be
explained by individual and market characteristics, leaving labor market
discrimination as one possible explanation for the observed gender earn-
ings di®erence of physicians.
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Earnings di®erentials between males and females are a persistent characteristic
of virtually every labor market (see, e.g., Blau and Kahn, 2003; Arulampalam,
Booth and Bryan, 2007; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008; for international evi-
dence). According to the empirical literature, this gap can be only partially ex-
plained by individual and market characteristics. The remaining (unexplained)
portion is usually attributed to gender discrimination (see, e.g., Cain, 1986; Al-
tonji and Blank, 1999, for comprehensive surveys; Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer, 2003, 2007; for meta studies). In line with this observation, substantial
unexplained gender earnings di®erentials have also been found in the physician
labor market. For instance, Kehrer (1976), analyzing survey data from the
American Medical Association, estimates a gender gap in average hourly earn-
ings of about 30 percent. Only a minor part of this di®erence is explained by
individual characteristics such as experience, speciality, or board certi¯cation,
among others. By and large, the subsequent empirical research lends support
to the ¯ndings of the Kehrer study (see Langwell, 1982; Ohsfeldt and Culler,
1986; Hampton, 1991; Hampton and Heywood, 1993; Bashaw and Heywood,
2001).1
Two characteristics of previous research make it worth to re-examine the
gender earnings gap of physicians. First, the existing studies rely on survey
data. The obvious disadvantages of survey data in analyzing gender earnings
di®erentials are that female physicians might have lower response rates than
male physicians, and, even if this is not the case, they might systematically re-
port lower incomes than male physicians.2 Consequently, the estimation results
are biased and the role of discrimination probably would be overestimated. Sec-
ond, the bulk of the empirical papers focuses on U.S. data. The traditional U.S.
health care system is characterized by a close relationship between health care
providers and patients. A (private) health insurance provider only reimburses
a patient's expenditures for physician services if they are included in his insur-
1One notable exception is Baker (1996). Using data from the 1991 U.S. Survey of Young
Physicians he did not ¯nd support for a gender wage gap. However, Bashaw and Heywood
(2001), re-estimating this study using the same data set, have demonstrated that this result
is driven by a misspeci¯cation of the earnings function (see footnote 4 below).
2One source of di®erences in reporting might be that females are more risk averse than
males, and are, therefore, less likely to overstate their income. This presumption is con¯rmed
by Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2006), who ¯nd that the di®erence between the reported income and
the self-designated reference income is much lower for female physicians. Further, survey data
are inherently confronted with a possible selection bias, which in our context would arise if
low-income earners (females) have di®erent response rates than high-income earners (males).
For example, Wood, Corcoran and Courant (1993, footnote 8), analyzing the gender gap in
lawyers' salaries, provide evidence for such a selection bias.
1ance plan. This, together with di®erences in the risk coverage among patients,
allows physicians to maximize income by setting prices discretionary (the in-
creased market share of Managed Care Organizations in the 90's has reduced
the scope for such price setting strategies; see Glied, 2000, for further details).
In contrast, in health care systems with traditionally strong public health insur-
ance providers, prices are usually agreed ex ante between the public insurance
company and representatives of the physicians. Under such a health care sys-
tem, it is ambiguous whether the gender earnings gap is higher or lower than
in a more privately ¯nanced system. On the one hand, a single physician does
not have control over the prices of medical services and, hence, only a moderate
in°uence on his earnings. In this case, income inequalities among male and
female physicians should be less important. On the other hand, the regulation
of prices inhibits competition. Becker's (1957) seminal work on the economics
of discrimination demonstrated that increased market competition would re-
duce or eliminate discrimination against disadvantaged groups (see Ashenfelter
and Hannan, 1986; Black and Strahan, 2001; Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske,
2002; for empirical evidence). In that case, we would expect a higher gender
earnings gap. After all, it remains an empirical question whether a gender
di®erential in physician earnings depends on the type of ¯nancing health care
services.
This paper contributes to the empirical research on the gender discrepancy
of physician earnings in two ways. First, we use data from a public health insur-
ance system based on Bismarckian principles. Second, we rely on earnings data
recorded by the public social security company rather than income reported by
the physicians. In particular, we refer to a panel of annual physicians' earnings
in the Austrian province of Tyrol between 2000 and 2004. This unique data set
gives us the opportunity to address both of the aforementioned limitations in
the previous literature. Apart from that, we are able to exploit more detailed
information on the individual characteristics of physicians, especially on their
activity levels (e.g., the number of patients treated within a year) and their
case-mix.
In our sample, we observe a gender earnings gap of about 32 percent. Apply-
ing the Blinder-Oaxaca framework to decompose the earnings di®erentials, we
¯nd that a substantial part of this di®erence cannot be explained by individual
and market characteristics (i.e., approximately 20 to 47 percent, depending on
the assumption about non-discriminatory earnings). In qualitative terms, these
results are well in accordance with previous studies, suggesting that discrimi-
nation is a robust and persistent phenomenon in the physician labor market,
2regardless of whether the health care system is dominated by private or public
health insurance providers.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2
describes the Austrian payment system for outpatient care. Section 3 presents
the data and the estimation method and discusses the empirical ¯ndings. The
last section summarizes our ¯ndings.
2 Physician payment in Austria
After obtaining a Doctor of Medicine degree (Dr. med.), which requires a min-
imum of six years full-time study (currently, the median time is 8 years), a
physician has to complete a medical training at an authorized institution (in
most cases a hospital). At that time, physicians choose their future special-
ization, i.e., either to work as a general practitioner (with a training of three
years) or to become a medical specialist (six years). Due to limited capacities
there is usually a waiting time between two and three years for medical train-
ing. Currently, an Austrian physician receives his ¯nal degree and, hence, the
license for practice at the age of 33 (general practitioners) or 36 (specialists),
on average. This license authorizes the physician (i) to work in a public (or
private) hospital on a salary basis, (ii) to o®er medical services as a 'private'
physician in the outpatient health care sector, or (iii) to apply for a contract
with a public health insurance provider. Physicians that belong to (ii) and (iii)
are self-employed. Our study focuses exclusively on (iii).
The public health insurance system is the dominating sector of the Austrian
health care system, especially in outpatient care. Public insurance is obligatory
for the working population (i.e., employees and self-employed); family members
(i.e., spouses and children) have access to health insurance coverage without ex-
tra payments if they are not insured by themselves. The system is regulated by
legislation at the federal level and operates under the supervision of the Federal
Ministry of Health. It mainly relies on income-based contributions. Its struc-
ture is determined with respect to territorial and occupational considerations,
and it is organized by representatives of employers and employees. Roughly 98
percent of the Austrian population is covered under the public health insurance.
80 percent of the covered population (mainly employees in the private sector
and their family members) has an insurance plan with a public health insurance
company at the provincial level, called 'Gebietskrankenkasse'.
Public outpatient care is predominantly o®ered on a contractual basis.
There is a basic agreement between the Main Association of Social Insurances
3(acting as an agent for public health insurance companies) and the Chamber of
Physicians at the level of provinces (acting as agent for the physicians). This
agreement determines the terms and conditions for the regional supply of pub-
licly ¯nanced outpatient care. More speci¯cally, it de¯nes the density of physi-
cians per speciality, their regional distribution, important dimensions of the
practice style (e.g., o±ce hours, treatment guidelines, limitations on secondary
employment) and the physician payment scheme, among others. Within this
regulatory framework, a physician can apply for a contract. Once concluded, a
contract is not limited in time. The assignment of contracts is based on criteria
such as date of application, professional experience, or additional medical quali-
¯cations. In our context, it is important to note that gender does not (o±cially)
constitute a relevant criterion for the o®ering of a contract. Further, we would
like to emphasize that the public outpatient sector in Austria can be charac-
terized as a "cottage industry" where sole proprietorship dominates; integrated
forms of health care (e.g., group practices or gatekeeping mechanisms) are sig-
ni¯cantly underdeveloped. Consequently, the contracts are typically signed by
the physicians individually.
Currently, about 50 percent of all physicians working (fulltime or part time)
in outpatient care work under a contract with a public health insurance com-
pany. However, the share of physicians without a contract has grown steadily
over time. One reason is that the number of physicians with a license to practice
has increased substantially in the last years. In addition, the Main Association
of Social Insurances and the Chamber of Physicians at the provincial level have
become more restrictive in o®ering contracts. As a consequence, waiting lists
of physicians seeking a contract have become longer and longer. Further, the
age at which a physician typically obtains a contract increased sharply from
around 33 years in 1973 to about 47 years in 2004.
Contracted physicians generate income from fee-for-service and lump-sum
payments. Lump-sum payments can be claimed for initial contacts per quarter
and for the provision of basic medical services (e.g., medical consulting, home
visits). The share of lump-sum payments to total physician earnings varies
widely over di®erent ¯elds of specialization. At an aggregate level for Austria it
amounts to about 68 percent for general physicians and around 34 percent for
specialists (specialists for diagnostic services excluded), on average (these values
belong to 2003). Details of the remuneration scheme itself are de¯ned in the
aforementioned agreement between the Main Association of Social Insurances
and the Chamber of Physicians at the level of provinces. Among others, it
includes a pre-de¯ned catalogue of services (treatments) that a physician is
4allowed to charge as well as the corresponding prices (fees). In other words,
contracted physicians are unable to set prices by their own.
The fee-for-service system works as follows. Generally, each physician re-
ceives a pre-de¯ned score ('points') per treatment. At the end of the accounting
period, these points are added up to calculate the total sum of scores. Then, a
monetary value is assigned to each point per treatment, which, in turn, depends
on the total number of points for the relevant accounting period. However, to
avoid a supplier induced demand inherently present in a fee-for-service system,
the system is capped by two mechanisms. In a ¯rst step, payments are limited
to a certain number of treatments per patient and time (e.g., general practi-
tioners and most specialists receive a maximum of 29 points per patient and
quarter). Additional treatments above this threshold are not remunerated by
the public insurance system, implying zero marginal earnings. In a second step,
total payments are 'tapered' in the sense that the marginal monetary payment
per point decreases with the total number of points and, therefore, with the
number of treatments. For example, general practitioners and most specialists
receive a monetary value of EUR 0.8913 per point if the total score is below
28,000 points per year, EUR 0.4477 between 28,001 and 36,000 points, and a
value of EUR 0.2235 above 36,001 points per year.
Physicians are allowed to earn extra money by providing additional ser-
vices 'beyond' the contract. Most importantly, physicians may (i) o®er services
to private patients, (ii) supply services to patients of other public insurance
companies (e.g., the one of public employees), (iii) work in a public or private
hospital, or (iv) volunteer for special tasks within the health care system (e.g.,
services at schools). Further, general practitioners in remote areas are allowed
to run a pharmacy if there is no commercially operated pharmacy in an ap-
propriate distance.3 All of these side-line employment activities are strongly
regulated by the physician contract (e.g., by upper limits of working hours in
these occupations).
With regard to earnings gaps between male and female physicians it is im-
portant to note that the remuneration scheme does not include direct incentives
for the provision of services to speci¯c groups of patients (e.g., for one and the
same treatment, there are not extra payments for treating older patients) or to
locate to remote areas. Further, there is no speci¯c monetary (dis-)advantage
for female physicians. Therefore, a gender earnings di®erential is not embedded
3Therefore, it is not their own decision to operate a pharmacy. The supply of pharmaceu-
ticals is regulated in the same way as for commercially held pharmacies. Additional revenue
generated from the operation of own pharmacies and other secondary employment options are
not included in our earning ¯gures reported below (Table 1).
5in the remuneration scheme.
Finally, people are also allowed to draw on the medical services of physicians
without a contract (private physicians). In contrast to contracted physicians,
private physicians are more or less free to set prices for their services; there are
only unbinding recommendations from the Chamber of Physicians. However,
since patients receive a lower reimbursement under a public insurance plan
if they claim for private physicians' services, the demand for their services is
relatively modest. Our interest is on the gender earnings gap of contracted
physicians (i.e., ones with no in°uence on prices). Further, earnings data of
private physicians are not collected by the social security companies and are,
therefore, not available. For these reasons, earnings data of private physicians
are not included in the following empirical analysis.
3 Empirical Analysis
Data and descriptive statistics: Our sample includes data from 504 physi-
cians (441 males and 63 females) with a public insurance contract in the Aus-
trian province of Tyrol for the period of 2000 to 2004. Overall, the dataset
contains about 2,000 observations (the descriptive statistics are reported in Ta-
ble A1 in the Appendix; the data sources are described in the Appendix). Table
1 summarizes the distribution of the areas of specialization, the mean annual
earnings and individual characteristics by specialization and sex, averaged over
the sample period. Notice that earnings are not identical to income (revenue
minus cost of running a practice), but it only covers the amount a physician
charges to the public insurance system for medical services (see Fujisawa and
Lafortune, 2008, for a similar de¯nition). Additional earnings from other med-
ical services (e.g., emergency doctor, school district doctor or income from a
pharmacy) are not included in our data set.
On average, the annual gross earnings of a male physician are EUR 195,575
(before taxes and social contributions), corresponding gross annual earnings
for a female are only EUR 154,155, or 76.1 percent of male earnings. The
average gender earnings gap amounts to 31.4 percent, varying widely over the
areas of specialization (from 139 percent for pediatrics to around -3 percent for
dermatology). It varies widely over the specializations; from {37.0 percent for
other specializations to 58.3 percent for pediatrics.
> Table 1 <
6One explanation for the gender earnings gap might be that female physicians
are relatively over-represented in specializations at the lower tail of the income
distribution (e.g., such as general practice or pediatrics). This seems not to be
the case in our sample (see Table 1). Perhaps more striking, however, is the fact
that female physicians work less than male ones (on average, 1.1 hours a week).
Correcting for this di®erence by calculating earnings per hour at an annual
basis, we obtain a gender earnings gap of EUR 27.9 (or 20.2 percent). Hence,
even if di®erences in working hours are accounted for, the earnings di®erential
between male and female physicians remains considerably large. Next, Table 1
shows two variables that are often considered as important sources of the gender
earnings gap, i.e., age and residential length (i.e., years since conclusion of the
contract). Both variables are typically used to approximate work experience
(e.g., Ohsfeldt and Culler, 1986). On average, we observe a gender di®erence in
age (residential length) of about 1.2 (2.2) years, indicating that work experience
might be an important source of the gender earnings gap.
Finally, one might suspect that di®erent working styles and activity levels
between female and male physicians might contribute signi¯cantly to the ex-
planation of the observed di®erence in earnings. In this regard, we collected
data on the number of patients and on the number of treatments per physician.
Both variables account for the productivity of physicians (see Kehrer, 1976;
Langwell, 1982). Further, our sample contains information on the demand for
physician services of three age groups: young patients (below 30 years), patients
between 31 and 60 years, and elderly (above 60 years). Then, we calculated
the shares of patients in each of these age groups to the total number of pa-
tients. Table 1 reports the average number of patients per hour (column 8),
the average number of treatments per hour (column 9) and the aforementioned
shares of patient groups (columns 11 to 12). As can be seen from Table 1,
a physician treats about four patients or reports 37 treatments per hour, on
average. Further, we observe a systematic di®erence in activity levels between
males and females which amounts to about 11 and 16 percent, respectively.
This is broadly in line with Constant and L¶ eger (2008) who investigate gender
di®erences in physicians services in Canadian provinces. Their ¯ndings sug-
gest that female physicians provide signi¯cantly less services than their male
counterparts. However, columns 10 to 12 of Table 1 indicate that the observed
di®erence in activity levels cannot be explained by the services provided to dif-
ferent age cohorts. We only ¯nd slightly lower relative activity levels of female
physicians in the group of older patients.
In sum, the descriptive analysis of the data illustrates that it is inevitable
7to account for individual characteristics when analyzing earnings di®erentials
between male and female physicians. In the following, we provide a systematic
approach to analyze the role of individual and market characteristics for the
observed physician gender earnings di®erential.
Speci¯cation and estimation: To disentangle the sources of the observed
earnings gap we use a standard wage decomposition as proposed by Blinder
(1973) and Oaxaca (1973). First, we estimate a Mincer-type earnings equation
for males and females separately (see Rizzo and Blumenthal, 1994, for a related
physician earnings function),
yit;m = x0
it;m¯m + ºit;m; (1)
yit;f = x0
it;f¯f + ºit;f; (2)
where yit is the log of annual earnings of the i-th physician in year t, and the
subscript m (f) indicates that the sample is restricted to males (females). x is
a vector of individual characteristics comprised of individual work experience
(i.e., working hours per week and non-working days per week interacted with a
variable indicating whether the physician o®ers services by appointment)4 and
the experience of the physician (i.e., age and its square, as well as the residential
length since the starting year of the contract). It further includes variables that
account for market characteristics (e.g., population and per capita income)
and market competition in outpatient care (see Becker, 1957). The latter is
captured by including the number of physicians in the medical district with and
without a contract (at the level of provinces, the Austrian health care system
is subdivided in medical districts). Finally, x also includes a set of dummy
variables for each of the specializations and additional individual characteristics
of the physicians (e.g., whether the physicians runs a pharmacy).5 Note that
the intercept, which serves as the reference group, is also included in x.6 In our
4Most of the empirical studies implicitly include working hours as a left-hand side variable
by de¯ning the log of hourly wages of physicians as the dependent variable (e.g., Baker, 1996).
However, Bashaw and Heywood (2001) have demonstrated that the true in°uence of hours
worked is inappropriately captured by such a speci¯cation. Hence, we follow their suggestion
and include the log of working hours on the right-hand side of (1) and (2) (see Wood, Corcoran
and Courant, 1993; Smith, 2002, for similar earnings equations).
5To account for time dependencies in earnings we also estimated alternative speci¯cations
including (i) time e®ects or (ii) a time trend in (1) and (2). It turned out, however, that they
were insigni¯cant in both the female and male regressions.
6Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) have demonstrated that the combined estimated contributions
of all dummy variables to overall unexplained parts (including the constant) and to overall
explained parts are not sensitive to the choice of the reference group. The choice of the
reference group would be only critical if the interest lies on the separate impact of the dummy
8case, the reference group are the general practitioners, and the corresponding
parameter estimates are reported in the constant term. º is an identically and
independently distributed stochastic error term.
Estimating both equations with (pooled) OLS (e.g., Ohsfeldt and Culler,
1986),7 and subtracting (2) from (1) yields
¹ ym ¡ ¹ yf = ¹ x0
m^ ¯m ¡ ¹ x0
f ^ ¯f
= ¹ x0
m(^ ¯m ¡ ¯¤) + ¹ x0









where ¹ ym (¹ yf) and ¹ x0
m (¹ x0
f) are the means of yit;m (yit;f) and x0
it;m (x0
it;f),
respectively (a 'hat' indicates estimated parameters from (1) and (2)). ¯¤ is a
vector of the non-discriminatory earnings structure, de¯ned as
¯¤ = ­^ ¯m + (I ¡ ­)^ ¯f: (4)
­ is a (diagonal) weighting matrix of dimension K (i.e., the number of
regressors), and I is the identity matrix. Following the original Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition we assume ­ = I (­ = 0), indicating that the non-
discriminatory earnings are those of male (female) physicians. In the former
case, it is implicitly assumed that discrimination penalizes the low-income group
(in our case females) by preventing them to obtain the wages of high-income
earners. In the latter case, we assume that discrimination favors the high-
income group by receiving a higher wage as in a world with non-discriminatory
earnings. Since non-discriminatory earnings might be somewhere in between
these two extremes in reality, we use three alternative weighting schemes: (i)
­ = 0:5I (see Reimers, 1983); (ii) ­ = sfI, where sf is the share of female
physicians to total physicians (see Cotton, 1988). In our sample sf is 0.155




and t are suppressed for the sake of brevity) which is equivalent to using the
parameter estimates of ¯ from the pooled sample (see Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca
and Ransom, 1994).
To illustrate the interpretation of (3), let us assume that ­ = I. Then,
variables on discrimination (see Jones, 1983; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999).
7It should be noted that the estimation of a standard ¯xed e®ects panel data model is
not applicable here, since the ¯xed male e®ects are wiped out in the female regression, and
vice versa. Using a random e®ects model we obtain similar results as in our speci¯cation,
especially with regard to the earnings decomposition. However, the Hausman test has to be
rejected indicating that the random e®ects estimator is inconsistent (see, e.g., Baltagi, 2005,
pp. 66). Hence, we do not report these ¯ndings, but they are available from the authors upon
request.
9(3) reads as ¹ ym ¡ ¹ yf = ¹ x0
f(^ ¯m ¡ ^ ¯f) + (¹ x0
m ¡ ¹ x0
f)^ ¯m. The second part on
the right-hand side evaluates the di®erence in earnings at the mean values of
the independent variables using male coe±cients. It informs about the gender
earnings di®erential explained by the regressions. The ¯rst part on the right-
hand side captures additional earnings a female physician would earn if she
were treated as a male. This is the unexplained portion of the earnings gap and
is usually assigned to discrimination.
Estimation results: Table 2 reports the regression results of the male and
female earnings equations along with the mean of the independent variables.
The last two columns show the explained portion of the earnings gap as de¯ned
in the last term on the right-hand side of (3) using male (­ = I) and female
coe±cients (­ = 0) as non-discriminatory earnings. In all regressions, we
correct for outliers by dropping observations in the upper and lower tail of the
error term (i.e., approximately two percent of the sample). To account for a
potential heteroscedasticity we report White-robust standard errors (see White,
1980).
The coe±cients of the regressors are almost as expected and also consistent
with studies using U.S. data. Working hours are positively related to earnings
(see Bashaw and Heywood, 2001). Further, the positive coe±cient for the
interaction term between days not worked and the dummy variable of services
by appointment suggests that physicians working outside the o±cial opening
hours earn a higher income, all else equal.8 In accordance with earlier studies,
age (age squared) enters signi¯cantly positive (negative) - at least in the male
regression - indicating a positive but diminishing impact of a physician's work
experience on annual earnings (see, e.g., Kehrer, 1976; Langwell, 1982; Ohsfeldt
and Culler, 1986; Bashaw and Heywood, 2001). Residential length exhibits a
positive impact on earnings, which is also in line with previous research (see
Ohsfeldt and Culler, 1986). Furthermore, we ¯nd signi¯cant positive e®ects
for all areas of specialization but pediatrics in the male regressions, and also
signi¯cantly positive ones for pediatrics and other specialities in the female
regressions.
With regard to the activity levels of physicians, we include (i) the total
number of treatments per physician and year, (ii) the share of patients aged
between 31 and 60 to the total number of patients, and (iii) the share of patients
older than 60 to the total number of patients (to avoid collinearity, the share of
8About ten percent of the physicians do not work at least one day in a (¯ve day working)
week. Around 28 percent o®er services by appointment outside the o±cial opening hours.
10patients younger than 30 to the total number of patients serves as the reference
group). Since payment for services usually varies over the age of patients, one
might expect that (ii) and (iii) enter signi¯cantly in our gender-speci¯c earnings
regressions. However, the sign of these variables is not clear a priori: On the
one hand, the frequency of doctor visits tends to increase with age, so that
we expect higher earnings for physicians treating more older patients. On the
other hand, services on older patients might be more time-consuming, implying
reduced earnings, on average. With regard to (iii), we would expect a positive
impact on earnings. In our case, the price per treatment is ¯xed by the social
insurance company, and, therefore, an increase in treatments per time unit
should automatically be associated with an increase in earnings. The estimation
results from Table 2 suggest that all variables indicating a physician's activity
level exert a signi¯cantly positive impact on earnings (with the exception of the
share of patients between 31 and 60 years which is insigni¯cantly negative in
the male regression).
> Table 2 <
To account for additional individual characteristics of physicians, we include
(i) a dummy variable with entry one if a physician runs a pharmacy by her-
self and zero otherwise (which is the case for about 18 percent of physicians
in the sample); (ii) a dummy variable for each of three additional characteris-
tics a physician may hold: emergency physician certi¯cate (46 percent), school
physician (2.5 percent), and medical district doctor including speci¯c tasks of
public health (e.g., control of epidemics) and the provision of medical services
on Sundays and holidays (17 percent); and (iii) a categorical variable indicating
whether the physician has a temporary outside appointment (18.6 percent of
the sample).9 As can be seen from Table 2, most of these variables take the
expected signs. A pharmacy held by a physician reduces earnings, on average,
which might be explained by the fact that pharmacies are only allowed to be
operated in rural areas where physician income is lower. Outside appointments
enter signi¯cantly positively with regard to the indicator variable of emergency
certi¯cate, but insigni¯cantly for the other two functions (i.e., medical district
9Speci¯cally, the variable takes the following entries: '1' in the case of a public hospital, '2'
for a private hospital, '3' for other social insurance institutions, and '4' for other health care
institutions outside the hospital sector (e.g., rehabilitation centers). In all other cases (i.e., no
temporary appointments outside), the variable is zero.
11doctor and school physician). Temporary appointments outside the ordina-
tion exhibit a negative but insigni¯cant impact on annual earnings, which is
consistent with Bashaw and Heywood (2001).
To control for the most important market characteristics and the speci¯c
economic situation of a province, which may in°uence the income situation of
physicians, we use the following information at the level of local jurisdictions
(municipalities and cities): (i) per capita income, (ii) population, (iii) living
area, (iv) number of tourist accommodations, and (v) the number of net com-
muters (i.e., di®erence of in- and out-commuters). As can be seen from Table 2,
we observe signi¯cant e®ects of per capita income, population size, living area
and tourist accommodations (population, living area, tourist accommodations
and commuters) in the male (female) regression. Tourist accommodations ex-
hibit a negative e®ect on earnings which seems reasonable given the fact that
medical services for tourists are usually not covered under a public insurance
plan; therefore, they are not included in our earnings data.
Further, we account for market concentration in the outpatient care as
measured by the number of physicians in the medical district (i) with and
(ii) without a contract. Considering these variables allows to analyze whether
discrimination is negatively related to market competition as discussed above
(see Becker, 1957). In our regressions, we ¯nd signi¯cantly positive e®ects for
the number of contracted physicians and signi¯cantly negative ones for private
physicians. This, in turn, indicates that competition regarding private physi-
cians tend to lower the income of contracted physicians, while competition in
the contracted physician market increases income. The latter result might be
driven by referrals from general (contracted) physicians to contracted special-
ists. Finally, we include the proportion of female to male physicians at the
level of medical districts. In this regard, Hampton (1991) has demonstrated
that the decomposition of physicians' earnings leads to biased results as long
as this variable is not controlled for. In accordance with earlier evidence from
labor market studies, he ¯nds that the income of both males and females is
negatively associated with the share of female physicians and that this e®ect is
more pronounced for males. For instance, if health care utilization was in°u-
enced by potentially di®erent treatment styles between males and females we
would expect such an e®ect in our case. In our sample, we obtain insigni¯cant
parameter estimates for this variable.
Overall, when using the male (female) coe±cients as non-discriminatory earn-
ings about 0.172 (0.274) of the total earnings gap can be explained by individual
12and market characteristics (see the last two columns of Table 2). In other words,
gender di®erences in individual and market characteristics generate an absolute
gender earnings di®erential of about 17.2 percent. Relying on male coe±cients,
most of the earnings gap is due to gender di®erences in experience and activity
levels (see the bold entries in the table; a negative entry indicates that the unex-
plained earnings gap widens when considering the gender di®erence in a speci¯c
variable group). For instance, the three experience variables age, age squared
and residential length account for 3.9 percent of the di®erence in earnings, which
is equal to about one quarter of the total explained earnings di®erential of 17.2
percent. About 70 percent of the explained earnings gap is due to di®erences in
activity levels. Using female coe±cients, we ¯nd that experience, activity levels
and market characteristics is the most in°uential set of variables. With regard
to activity levels, the main share of the explained part is due to the number
of treatments. As discussed above, this variable should measure the produc-
tivity of physicians. If female physicians charged fewer treatments than their
male counterparts they would be less e±cient and, therefore, they would obtain
systematically lower earnings than male physicians (see Langwell, 1986, for a
detailed discussion). The positive coe±cients reported in the last two columns
of Table 2 indicate that this seems to be the case in our sample of Tyrolean
physicians.
The positive value of market concentration in both male and female repre-
sentation indicates that the unexplained part of the earnings gap is lower in a
competitive environment which is consistent with the aforementioned hypothe-
sis of Becker (1957) and the corresponding empirical evidence (see Ashenfelter
and Hannan, 1986; Black and Strahan, 2001; Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske,
2002). However, this entry should be interpreted with caution as it is a result of
positive and negative coe±cients for sub-components of physician competition.
Decomposition of the gender earnings gap: As can be seen from Table
3, the overall di®erence in log earnings is signi¯cant and amounts to 0.323 (or
32.3 percent) which comes close to the results in previous studies (especially
Kehrer, 1976; Langwell, 1992; Bashaw and Heywood, 2001). The share of
explained factors is 0.172 in absolute value (53.2 percent of the total earnings
gap). The remaining part, around 15.1 percent (equal to 46.8 percent of the
total gender gap), is due to unexplained factors.10
10Regarding the above described earnings decomposition Ohsfeldt and Culler (1986) empha-
size that one obtains biased results if the assumption of log-normally distributed error terms
is violated. To account for this potentially violated assumption we undertake a sensitivity
check by applying two alternative approaches for decomposition as proposed by Ohsfeldt and
13The lower block of Table 3 summarizes the results for alternative assump-
tions on the non-discriminatory earnings. As expected, using female coe±cients
to decompose the earnings gap reduces the share of unexplained factors sub-
stantially to about 15 percent. However, this entry is insigni¯cant, so that
a value of 20 percent (from the Cotton-decomposition) seems a more reliable
lower bound for the unexplained gender earnings gap.
> Table 3 <
It might further be of interest to analyze how the total earnings di®erential
and its unexplained part have changed over the course of the years. To address
this question, we estimate (1) and (2) for each year separately and calculate
earnings decompositions as in Table 3. The results are shown in Figure 1.
Entries in the upper region of the graph inform about the total earnings gap.
Further, Figure 1 plots upper and lower bounds of the unexplained earnings gap
as represented by our decomposition approaches discussed above (and reported
in Table 3). Entry '*' indicates signi¯cance at least at the 10 percent level. As
can be seen from the ¯gure, the entries of the lower bounds are insigni¯cant with
the exception for the ¯rst entry. The reason is that the sample only includes
63 female observations per annum, rendering the parameter estimates in the
female representations less reliable than the ones in the male representations.
Hence, the lower bounds in Figure 1 should be interpreted with caution.
> Figure 1 <
From 2000 to 2002, the gender earnings di®erential decreased from 34.8
to 28.6 percent. Since then, it increased to 31.1 percent in 2003 and 33.2
percent in 2004. With respect to the unexplained gender gap we do not ¯nd
signi¯cant changes between 2000 and 2004. While the upper bounds remain
relatively stable within a range of around 40 to 50 percent, the lower bounds
declined from 38 percent in 2000 to 23.4 percent in 2004. As mentioned above,
these results are not signi¯cant and, therefore, we hardly can interpret the
lower bounds as evidence for a diminishing role of the unexplained earnings
Culler (1986). It turns out that the shares of unexplained factors are slightly below the ones
with male coe±cients. For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results here, but they
are available from the authors upon request.
14gap. Overall, Figure 1 con¯rms that the unexplained earnings di®erential left
more more or less unchanged, although the total gender gap slightly decreased
over the sample period. Hence, to the extent that the unexplained earnings
di®erentials can be interpreted as discrimination (see the discussion below),
our results clearly point to a considerable and persistent role of discrimination
in the Tyrolean physician labor market.
Finally, it is encouraging to compare our results to the ¯ndings of the existing
research. In this regard, two strands of literature have to be considered. First,
studies on the (general) gender wage di®erential in the Austrian labor market
suggest an overall income gap of about 25 to 30 percent. For instance, a recent
study by BÄ oheim, Hofer and Zulehner (2007) reports an overall gender wage
gap of about 25 percent and a share of discrimination of around 60 to 70 percent
(see also Ponthieux and Meurs, 2005; Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2007;
Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008; for similar evidence from the Austrian labor
market). Further, they ¯nd that the wage di®erential increases with income
(see also Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2007; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008).
Given that physicians belong to the group of high-income earners, our ¯ndings
seem to be in line with this evidence. Second, previous work based on U.S.
physicians' income indicates substantial gender earnings di®erentials and also
a large share of unexplained factors. For instance, Kehrer (1973) observes an
earnings di®erential of 36 percent and an unexplained share of around 70 percent
(see Hampton, 1991, for similar results). Bashaw and Heywood (2001) provide
somewhat higher estimates of the total earnings gap (around 50 percent) but
lower ones for the unexplained earnings gap (around 20 to 30 percent), and
Langwell (1982) ¯nds a total earnings gap of 30 percent but a similar share of
unexplained factors as in the Kehrer study. The corresponding estimates of our
study are broadly lying within this range. This, in turn, raises the question on
the sources of discrimination.
The main distinction between our ¯ndings and the previous literature on
gender earnings gaps in physician earnings is that we explicitly control for
pricing and activity levels which are often considered as natural candidates to
explain the unexplained share of the gender earnings gap (see, e.g., Langwell,
1982). However, the similarity between our results and that in previous research
indicates that there are obviously more important explanations for the observed
discrimination in the physician labor market. Possible sources of discrimination
might be, for example, preferential treatments of male physicians to enter the
market (i.e., privileges in contract assignment), the referring behavior of general
15practitioners (representing the gatekeepers in the Austrian health care system)
or gender-biased demand for health services. Apart from that, it has to be taken
into consideration that at least parts of the unexplained earnings di®erential
might result from di®erences in unobservable skills and factors (e.g., ambitions,
di®erent work-leisure allocations between male and female physicians) other
than discrimination. As pointed out by Ohsfeldt and Culler (1986), we should
therefore interpret the unexplained part of the observed earnings di®erential as
an upper bound of the in°uence of discrimination.
4 Conclusions
This paper studies earnings di®erentials between male and female physicians. It
extends the previous empirical research using physicians earnings data recorded
by a social security agency rather than survey data (self-reported income).
Further, relying on earnings data from an Austrian province we refer to a system
with dominating public health insurance providers, which, compared to a U.S.
typed private health care system, gives physicians less possibilities to directly
in°uence their income. Speci¯cally, we use a panel of earnings of physicians in
an Austrian province between 2000 and 2004. To the best of our knowledge,
such a data set has not yet been analyzed. Empirically, we apply a Blinder-
Oaxaca approach to decompose the earnings gap into an explained and an
unexplained share.
Our ¯ndings can be summarized as follows. In accordance with existing
studies, we observe a gender earnings di®erential of about 32 percent. Al-
though this gap can be largely explained by individual and market character-
istics, a substantial portion of unexplained di®erences remains. Depending on
the assumption about non-discriminatory earnings, we ¯nd that the share of
unexplained factors to the total earnings gap lies within a range of 20 to 47 per-
cent. Although the gender earnings gap has slightly decreased between 2000 and
2004, there is no indication that the unexplained part of this gap has reduced
over the course of years. This evidence suggests that gender earnings equality
has not been achieved in the Austrian physician labor market. It further reveals
that gender di®erences in earnings are a robust and persistent phenomenon in
the physician labor markets, irrespective of whether the health care system is
dominated by private companies or public social insurance providers.
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Appendix
Data sources: Information on the annual earnings of the physicians and their activ-
ity levels between 2000 and 2004 are covered by the 'Gebietskrankenkasse' of the Austrian
province of Tyrol. Additionally, we use the following information on individual characteristics
of contracted physicians and the physicians labor market from this province:
² Hours worked, days not worked, services by appointment, age, residential length, spe-
cialities, additional individual characteristics (own held pharmacy, emergency certi¯-
cate, medical district doctor, school physician, temporary appointment outside): Ä Oster-
reichische Ä Arztekammer, Ä Arzteliste (o±cial index of the Austrian chamber of physi-
cians), various years.
² Income (average wage income per employed person), population, area, tourist accom-
modations, in- and out-commuters: Statistical handbook of the local government of
Tyrol, various years.
² Number of physicians in the medical district with and without a contract are covered
by the above cited 'Ä Arzteliste'.
19Descriptive statistics: Table A1
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